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This paper quantitatively examined the relation between money and real economy in 
the Soviet economy. The institutional and historical analysis of the Soviet monetary 
management yielded the tasks of quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis 
showed that the institutional division of cash and non-cash was effective, demand for 
cash was not predictable, and there was no significant relation between money and real 
production. This result suggested that the Soviet monetary management relying on 
some vague money supply target could not function well and only the control on wage 
which was supported by the division of cash and non-cash could weakly ceil money 
supply. A fundamental problem of the Soviet economy seemed that a mechanism to 
bridge between money and real economy was lacked, while money was used. It is, 
therefore, difficult to regard the Soviet economic system as an complete economic 




  The Soviet administrative command economy was the largest economic 
experiment in the twentieth century: the results of this experiment are a unique material 
to investigate an economic system as a whole. The opening-up of the Soviet archives 
greatly helped to understand the Soviet economic system (see Gregory, 2001; Gregory, 
2004; Gregory and Harrison, 2005); many questions, however, remain still unanswered. 
The monetary management in the Soviet economy is one of those questions. 
  Material planning, that is, administrative allocation of resources, was the main 
pillar of the Soviet economic system. Material planning restricted the role of money 
more or less; it did not, however, demise money. The 'passive money' concept 
summarized the role of money in the Soviet economy (see Baykov, pp. 414-5; Gregory, 
p. 192; Brus, pp. 65-83): Holding money was not sufficient to move economic 
resources; administrative permission was always necessary to transact resources except 
for in the sphere of household consumption. On the other hand, whenever economic 
resources were transacted, money moved according to the transaction. Because money 
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 always followed the movements of resources, money was able to serve as a tool to 
monitor and control economic activities.   
  This concept of passive money reflected the realities of money in the Soviet 
economy well. The concept, nevertheless, had some ambiguity: First, the concept of 
passive money said nothing about illegal economic transactions. The point noted here is 
not that how significant illegal economic activities were, but that the concept of passive 
money concerns the legal and institutional aspects of monetary management. Secondary, 
contrasting to the first point, the concept of passive money scarcely explained economic 
contents of the Soviet monetary management: what the concepts said was only that 
money moved legally and passively according to legal economic transactions. It is 
certainly different questions if a transaction is legal and if the transaction is 
economically rational. Even if a legal transaction is not economically rational, money 
will move legally according to the transaction. Assuming only that we do not have 
perfect foresight, allocations of resources are not always economically rational. This 
leads to the third ambiguity of the passive money concept: how the Soviet authority 
managed the legal but economically irrational movements of money? This consideration 
further leads to a fundamental question on the passive money concept: how we can 
understand the situation in which money had its economic value and, at the same time, 
money was passive. What that money has its economic value means that money has 
power to influence resource allocation. If money cannot influence resource allocation at 
all, it is not very meaningful to discuss monetary stability and monetary management. In 
the actual Soviet economy, monetary disequilibrium manifested itself as phenomena of 
queues, shortages, excess stocks, low productivity, vitalization of shadow economy, and 
social dissatisfaction. If material planning was revised to eliminate these phenomena, 
we may say that money could actively influence resource allocation and had economic 
value.  
The purpose of this study is to quantitatively examine how money was related to real 
economy, passively or actively, using monetary statistics which have become available 
recently. We will return to discussion on the validity of the passive money concept after 
the quantitative analysis. 
The scope of this study is limited to legal economic activities; illegal economic 
activities are not the subject of investigation. This is firstly because data needed to 
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 investigate illegal economic activities are not available. Secondarily, it seems that we 
are able to find fundamental difficulty in the Soviet money management even if we 
limit our scope to legal economic activities. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the historical and 
institutional aspects of the Soviet money management to make it clear what we should 
quantitatively analyze. Section 3 explains the data used for the quantitative analysis and 
reports the results of preliminary analysis of the data. Section 4 reports the findings and 
results of the quantitative analysis. Section 5 discusses the validity of the passive money 
concept and directions of the further research. 
2. Soviet monetary management: history and institution 
  Both Soviet and non-Soviet literature explains institutions and functions of the 
Soviet monetary management (Ikonnikov, 1954; Tochil'nikovɼ  1973; Alkhimov, 1981; 
Podshivalenko, 1983; Kravtsovaya, 1983; Garvy, 1972; Kuschepeta, 1978; Sigg, 1981). 
This section surveys the goal, the institution, and the targets and instruments of the 
Soviet monetary management to design the quantitative analysis.   
2.1 The goal of monetary management 
  Soviet literature claimed that the goal of the Soviet monetary management was 
the stability in the value of money and the Soviet planned economy, where one could 
directly control demand and supply of goods as well as prices of goods, could achieve 
the goal (see Baykov, 1970, p. 415; Ikonnikov, 1954, pp. 31-39; Institute, 1962, ch. 32; 
Tsagolov, ch. 25). On the other hand, non-Soviet scholars have discussed repressed or 
hidden inflation in the Soviet economy: they believed that monetary disequilibria 
occurred and caused various negative phenomenon including queues, shortages, and 
prosperity in black markets (Holzman, 1960; Grossman, 1963; Dyker, 1985, pp. 79-84; 
Birman, 1981).   
  Systematic data which showed what the target of the Soviet monetary 
management was and how they intended to achieve the target were not available: in the 
first place, Soviet literature did not give a clear definition of the stability in the value of 
money. The Soviet authority, nevertheless, obviously recognized that monetary 
disequilibria could cause serious economic problems. This understanding seemed to be 
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 based on not theoretical considerations but the experiences of hyperinflation during the 
periods of the war communism, the first years of the first five-year plan, and World War 
II. Additionally to those periods, they experienced hyperinflation during the latter half 
of the Perestroika period. It seems that the war communism and the first years of the 
first five-year plan were only the periods when the Soviet authority intentionally 
lowered the priority of the monetary stabilization: in the periods of World War II and 
the Perestroika, the Soviet authority was forced to compromise the monetary stability 
for the war financing and the acceleration policy of economic growth, respectively. We 
briefly survey the situation of the monetary management in those periods. 
  The war communism was the period when the monetary stability was 
abandoned because of not only need for the war financing but also the belief in 
communist ideology (see Ikonnikov, 1954, ch. 5). The Imperial Russia suspended the 
gold standard in January 1914 to finance the costs of World War I. The Soviet 
government, which was in serious financial difficulty under the civil and interfering war, 
abolished in May 1919 all restrictions on banknote issue that still existed after the 
abandonment of the gold standard. In January 1920, the Soviet government abolished 
the banking system itself and started using governmental paper money only. The result 
of this policy was the hyperinflation and the barter economy
1. As the civil and 
interfering war was over, the economic policy of the war communism was regarded as 
unsustainable. The policy course was changed to the New Economic Policy, which 
reintroduced the elements of market economy. In October 1921, less than one year after 
its abolition, the banking system was reestablished. The reestablished Gosbank
2 had 
right to issue banknotes subject to the issue guarantee and the limit on issue. After 
reintroduction of the banking system, monetary reform had been carried out during the 
period of 1922 to 1924. The eleventh party congress in 1922 set the principle of the 
monetary reform to stabilize the value of money by maintaining budget surplus and 
reintroduction of a gold-standard currency. Following this resolution, Gosbank issued 
                                                        
1  93% of the total wage were paid in kind around the beginning of 1921 (Kuschpeta, 1978, p. 28) 
2  The name of the bank reestablished was the People's Bank of the RSFSR. Hereafter, Gosbank 
(Gosdurstvenyii bank: the state bank) is used to refer to the bank that was located at the center of the 




 Chervonets notes; 25% of their value were backed by gold and foreign exchange and the 
other 75% by short-term bills and goods. Chervonets circulated from 1922 through to 
1924. Chervonets were traded at the international money markets at that time and kept a 
stable exchange rate (Segal and Santalov, 1925, p. 347; Segal and Santalov, 1930, p. 
417). The inflation, however, did not stop until 1924 when the trade balance and the 
budget balance turned to surplus (Ikonnikov, 1954, pp. 144-7). In 1924, the 1924-face 
Ruble was issued and all other old banknotes including Chervonets, paper moneys, and 
money surrogates were withdrawn from circulation: the monetary reform was 
completed. 
  In 1930s, the period of the Industrialization, the course of monetary policy was 
in dispute as the course of economic policy was. Davies(2001, pp. 72-3) indicated that 
Pyatakov, who was the president of Gosbank in 1928, executed an inflationary policy to 
provide firms with funds almost without limitation to accelerate the industrialization. As 
negative influences of the inflation became clear, the policy was changed and Pyatakov 
was removed from his post in October 1930. After that, Gosbank followed a tight 
monetary policy: Gregory (2004, p. 228-9) noted that the Soviet authority wanted to 
keeping the growth rate of monetary supply with the real economic growth rate. Such 
tight monetary policy could not accommodate to rapid structural changes in economy at 
the Industrialization period. Most of senior managers in the Gosbank, who supported 
the tight monetary policy or the monetary policy in the time of the gold standard, were 
expelled during the Purge of 1936 to 1939; it was, however, not clear how the purge 
was related to dispute on monetary policy (see Davies, 2003). 
  During World War II, money supply increased rapidly to finance the war 
efforts. The increase in money supply caused increase in prices both in the state sector 
and in the kolkhoz market. The Soviet monetary authority was cautious to the risk of 
excess liquidity held by rural households and the hyperinflation: this means that the 
Soviet monetary authority recognized that money might actively influence resource 
allocation (see CBR, 2007b; CBR, 2007c). A monetary reform was envisaged already 
during the war (CBR, 2007a). The monetary reform was carried out in 1947 after 
abolishing the rationing system and raising state retail prices: the reform was successful 
in restoring the monetary stabilization. In the 1947 monetary reform, the old-face ruble 
notes were exchanged with the new-face ones at the rate of 10 to 1. The amount of 
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 households deposits less than three thousands ruble at the saving bureau (Seberkassa) 
kept the same amount at new ruble; household deposits over 3000 to 10,000 at old ruble 
were reduced to two thirds of its amount at new ruble; household deposits over 10,000 
at old ruble were halved at new ruble. Business deposits were not revalued. Because the 
1947 monetary reform did not include denomination, the nominal amounts of financial 
flows including wages and pensions remained unchanged. The Soviet official statistics 
did not do any adjustment to the values of the nominal indicators such as nominal net 
material products and average monthly wage before and after the 1947 monetary reform. 
As a matter of fact, the 1947 monetary reform was a vigorous action to reduce excess 
liquidity by confiscating horded currency and high-amount deposits. There is not much 
doubt on that the Soviet authority concerned over monetary destabilization. 
  During the 1950s, the Soviet authority executed a policy which was to reduce 
consumer prices in order to increase real income (Nove, 1992, pp. 333-335, 354-358; 
Khanin, 2003). Consumer prices were increased in 1946 for abolition of the rationing in 
1947; consumer prices showed a decreasing tendency afterwards. Industrial wholesale 
prices were increased as subsidies were decreased in 1949; they were reduced in 1950 
and 1952. Money supply, however, grew low but continuously during the period from 
1950 to 1960: The monetary authority (CBR, 2008) reported that it was contented itself 
so far with that money supply was controlled within the permissible range, but it was 
watching carefully the increasing tendency of money stock and, therefore, requested the 
planning and industrial authorities to increase retail sales in order to channel currency 
back to Gosbank.   
  Inflation occurred in the Perestroika period (see Ellman, 1992). One important 
cause for the inflation was to finance budget deficits by Gosbank credit. At the same 
time, price control was weaken as private economic activities were allowed. Apart from 
the judgment if the economic policy in the Perestroika period was appropriate, it was 
understandable that the Soviet authority gave priority to continuation of the Soviet 
system over the monetary stability.   
  This survey showed that the stability of the value in money was at least one of 
the goals of the Soviet monetary management.   
2.2 Institutional background of the Soviet monetary management 
  The main institutional pillars of the Soviet monetary management were the 
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 mono-bank system, the ban on commercial credits and the restricted provision of bank 
credit, the division of cash and non-cash money flows, and the foreign exchange 
monopoly. The key institutional framework of the monetary management was formed at 
the 1930/32 credit reform
3 and have remained basically unchanged until the collapse of 
the Soviet system. We survey the institutional framework of the Soviet monetary 
management focusing on money supply channels.   
  The basic elements of the mono-bank system were rejection of the two tire 
banking system, concentration of banking operations in Gosbank, and assigning each 
firm to one and only bank branch office. 
  Gosbank was only bank through the Soviet era. Until the end of the New 
Economic Policy, there were various banking institutions. Gosbank was, however, the 
dominant bank at that time, which performed both commercial and central banking 
services. Gosbank's performing both commercial and central banking services was not a 
socialist invention but a tradition form the Imperial State Bank (Gurvy, 1972, pp. 882-3). 
Even after the 1930/32 credit reform, there were other banks including the foreign trade 
bank and some sectoral banks. The foreign trade bank had performed solely foreign 
exchange operations and almost nothing to do with domestic banking. After the 1930/32 
credit reform, the sectoral banks have performed long-term credit service only; the 
long-term credit service was actually to administer investment funds which were 
financed by the state budget and disbursed to the specific spheres including housing 
construction and agricultural cooperatives
4. There did not exist a commercial bank - 
central bank relationship between Gosbank and the sectoral banks. Gosbank performed 
all of short-term credit service and all settlement operations. All firms had transactional 
relationship with Gosbank through Gosbank's settlements service, while each firm was 
                                                        
3  The major decrees and resolutions dated on 30 January 1930, 14 January 1931, 20 March 1931, 23 
March 1931, 21 October 1931, and 5 May 19329 931.3.20 are printed in Reshenya (1967, vol.2). 
4 Capital investments and increases in prescribed liquid assets in the state corporate sector were 
directly financed by the state budget. The 1965 economic reform introduced long-term bank credit as 
a financing source for the state capital investment projects for the first time (Resheniya, vol. 5, 1968, 
pp. 658-685, Art. 41). The share of the long-term credit in the total amount of the state capital 




 allowed to open its bank account only one Gosbank branch office. This scheme gave 
Gosbank a possibility to monitor all individual transactions of all firms.   
  The ban on commercial credit was an instrument to increase Gosbank's ability 
to monitor firms. Short-term credits provided by Gosbank replaced commercial credits; 
at the same time, granting short-term credit was restricted. Gregory and Tikhonov(2000) 
and Gregory(2003, pp. 224-6) reported that Gosbank granted credits almost freely at 
firms' demands occurred at the first stage of 1930/32 credit reform. This caused the 
inflation in the first years of the 1930s. Facing the unexpected outcome, the initial 
concept of the credit reform was revised: short-term credits were granted to cover only 
financial needs difficult to be forecasted and standardized, such as outlay related to 
seasonal fluctuations and to goods under transportation and settlement. The loans 
should be secured with material collaterals and using borrowing funds for purposes 
other than the prescribed was prohibited. Therefore, the item of loan was changed from 
loan to work-in-progress goods, to loan to finished goods, to loan to goods on 
transportation, and finally to loan to goods on settlement as the production process 
advanced within a firm (Smirnov, 1982, p. 40). While use of bank loan was restricted, 
the interest rate was uniformly fixed and terms of loan were not differentiated by firm. 
Supply and demand for bank loan was adjusted administratively: Gosbank allocated 
quotas by item of loan to each firm on applications from the firm. The basic idea of the 
Soviet credit system was that the financial needs of the firms should be covered by the 
state budget (see Baykov, 1970, pp. 407-8); short-term credit was regarded as a 
subsidiary financial source.   
  Commercial credit was banned; it, however, continued to exist in the forms of 
accounts receivable and payable after the 1930/32 credit reform through to the collapse 
of the Soviet system (Gregory, 2003, pp. 226-31; Nakamura, 1984). These 
inter-company credits accounted for 13 to 20% of the liquid assets financing of the state 
enterprises
5. On the other hand, the state enterprises in the heavy industry scarcely used 
bank credits until the latter part of the 1950s. It was relatively easy to forecast and 
standardize the demands for liquid funds in the heavy industry sector; these financial 
                                                        
5  Narkhoz(1968, p. 862; 1981, p.511; 1991, p. 27) indicated that the inter-company credit accounted 
for 20%, 14%, 13%, 23.5%, and 23.1% of the liquid asset financing of the state firms at the end of 
1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990, respectively. 
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 needs were financed by the budget money. Use of bank credit started to expand in the 
heavy industry sector in the latter part of the 1950s when the policy course was changed 
to a more flexible short-term credit supply (Rotleider, 1979, ch. 15)
6. The purposes of 
increasing the flexibility of short-term credit were as follows: First, the switch from 
budget financing free from principal and interest repayments to credit financing with 
obligations of repayment was expected to increase efficiency of funds use
7. Second, 
flexible financing was expected to eliminate the financing sources that were out of 
Gosbank control, such as inter-company credit and funds allocation among corporations 
by order of the higher industrial administrative organizations (see Davies, 1953; 
Shenger, 1961, p. 225-230; Gregory and Tikhonov, 2000). A bank loan facility (kredit 
po oborot) which grew in use around the 1965 economic reform boosted to use of bank 
loan
8 by the state enterprises. The loan facility was similar to the overdraft account: 
material collaterals to the loan were not required, the object of the loan was not 
specified, and temporal overdrawing was allowed. The introduction of this loan facility, 
however, resulted in a deterioration of the financial discipline of corporations. The use 
of the facility was restricted in the latter half of the 1970s; the 1979 economic reform 
(see Resheniya, vol. 13, p. 116, Art. 57) expanded again use of the facility (see 
Nakamura, 1984, pp. 54-5).   
  The division of cash and non-cash money flows represented the following 
institutional setting: the transactions of the household sector were settled by cash money, 
while all other transactions by account transfer by each transaction. Gosbank obtained a 
possibility to monitor each transaction of the corporations and could limit cash money 
circulation to the sphere of household transactions. Because of this institutional setting, 
the corporations did not need to transact cash money except for wage payments and 
proceeds from retail sales. The corporations were permitted to withdraw cash money 
from their non-cash funds only to pay wages, the amount of which was most severely 
                                                        
6  See Resheniya, 21 August 1954, Arts. 12-17, vol. 4, pp. 129-144; Resheniya, 4 October 1965, Arts. 
20 and 45, vol.8, pp. 658-685; Resheniya, 3 April 1967, Arts. 4 and 7, vol.6, pp. 365-376; Resheniya, 
22 August 1973, Arts. 1 and 2, vol. 9, 632-634. 
7  Differentiation of terms of loan to poorly performing and defaulting corporations was introduced 
in 1954 (Reshenya, 21 August 1954, Art. 2-12, vol. 4, pp. 129-144). 
8  See Resheniya, 4 October 1965, Art. 43, vol.8, pp. 658-685. 
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 controlled by the authority.   
  There is not much doubt on that the division of cash and non-cash money flows 
contributed to improving the Soviet authority's ability to control a money supply 
channel, along which financing the corporations by the state budget funds and the bank 
loans resulted in an increase in cash money. The Soviet authority highly relied on the 
effectiveness of the division of cash and non-cash money flows: Savluk (1982, pp. 
156-7) wrote that the relation between cash and non-cash money flows and its possible 
influence on the monetary management were not considered at all until to the 1950s. 
The division of cash and non-cash money flows, however, could not mean that there 
was no economic relation between cash and non-cash money. If we consider illegal and 
law-circumventing activities, the corporations could convert their non-cash funds into 
cash money through the Soviet era (Gregory, 2004, pp. 220-221). Even if we consider 
only the legal activities, cash and non-cash money flows were interacted. When the 
corporations withdrew cash, they needed to have had non-cash funds (Shenger, 1961, p. 
102): the cash flow depends on funding situations of the corporation itself and its 
partner corporations. Their funding situations were, at least, partly related to financing 
by budget money and bank loans. Some poor-performing corporations might pay wages 
thank to financial help in the form of budget money, bank loan, inter-company credit, 
and funds allocated by the higher administrative organization. Even after that some 
Soviet scholars began to admit the existence of economic relation between cash and 
non-cash money (see Shenger, 1961; Levchuk, 1971; Barkovskii, 1976) in the latter part 
of the 1950s, it did not seem to seriously inquire how effectively cash and non-cash 
money were interacted. To quantify this effectiveness is one of the purposes of our 
quantitative analysis. 
  The monopoly of foreign exchange reflected that the domestic circulation of 
ruble and the flow of foreign exchange were institutionally speparated (Garvy, 1977, ch. 
7; Kuschpeta, 1978, pp. 189-202; Sigg, 1981, ch. 6). The corporations were not allowed 
to transact foreign exchange and foreign currency even when they did export and 
import; there was, therefore, no need for the corporations to exchange foreign currency 
with ruble. Because there was no need to exchange foreign currency except for tourism, 
there was no foreign exchange market and no exchange rate. This administrative 
separation between the flows of foreign exchange and ruble closed another money 
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 supply channel, along which exchange of foreign currency caused changes in the 
volume of ruble supply. 
  It was difficult to find any evidence that the Soviet authority considered the 
exchange ratios of ruble to foreign currencies as a important factor in monetary 
management. Although there was no market exchange rate in the Soviet economy, it 
was possible to calculate an ex post ratio of the foreign sales price to the domestic 
procurement price of an export good (see Marer, 1985, 28-33; IMF et al., 1991, vol. 1, 
pp. 421-430). The Soviet authority might use the information of this conversion ratio for 
the monetary management. CBR(2008, p. 62) revealed that the Soviet authority set the 
gold parity of the 1961 ruble at about one twenty-second of that of the before 1961 
ruble in order to reduce an export subsidy of 33 billion Ruble on the 1961 annual 
economic plan to 7 billion; on the other hand, the conversion ratio of the new ruble to 
the old ruble was 10 to 1 at the 1961 denomination. So far as this change in the gold 
parity altered the Gosbank balance sheet, it might influence the domestic money supply; 
this change in the gold parity, however, seemed relevant not to the monetary 
management but to the fiscal policy. In the rest of this paper, we assume that the Soviet 
authority did not consider external purchasing power of ruble as a factor in monetary 
management. 
 
  The review on the institutional design of the Soviet monetary management 
indicated that there existed only the money supply channel of wages payments, 
assuming the fiscal discipline and the foreign exchange monopoly. 
2.3 Final target, intermediate target, and instruments 
  The Soviet authority pursued the monetary stability in the institutional settings 
of monetary management described above; it was, however, not clear how the monetary 
stability was defined. Early Soviet economics textbooks like the Institute edition (1962, 
chs. 26 and 32) claimed that the value of ruble was secured because the gold parity of 
ruble was set. This view was, however, not acceptable: ruble was neither gold coin nor 
gold-convertible note. In the system of managed money where money itself ( in the 
forms of paper note, electric signal, and so on) did not contain economic value, the 
stability of value in money is defined in relation with price index, exchange rate, and 
interest rate. The value in money itself, therefore, cannot serve as an operable target of 
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 the monetary management. The intermediate targets, which can be controlled by policy 
instruments, are necessary to attain the final goal of monetary stability. In the Soviet 
economy, money supply was controlled through 'the balance method of money 
circulation management' (Kravtsovaya, 1983, p. 145). The balance method meant that 
cash money circulation was planned and managed being based on the balance tables 
including 'the monetary income and outlay balance of the household sector', 'the cash 
flow balance of the Gosbank', and 'the balance of bank credit'. This sub-section 
discusses what the intermediate targets in the Soviet monetary management were and 
which policy instruments they intended to use to achieve the intermediate targets.   
  The monetary income and outlay balance (Table 1 (A)) was a part of annual 
economic plan; the national planning agency, Gosplan, was in charge of compilation of 
both prospective and report balances in the annual and quarterly terms. The change in 
household deposits was an item of outlay in the balance; the closing item was the 
change in cash money hold by households. As cash money was circulated only in the 
sphere of household transactions, the monetary income and outlay balance comprised all 
cash transactions. 
  The cash flow balance (Table 1 (B)) was a document for Gobank’s cash 
operation. The cash flow balance was not a part of the annual economic plan; it should 
be, however, approved by the council of ministers (Ikonnikov, 1954, p. 35; Alkhimov, 
1981, p. 43). All unit of the Gosbank network, from the headquarter to the terminal 
branch offices, compiled the monthly, quarterly, and annual cash flow balances to avoid 
excess and deficiency of cash money by them. The most important source of 
information for a Gosbank branch office to compile the cash flow balance was the cash 
plans of the enterprises and organizations which have their accounts at the branch 
office
9. It was obviously impossible to foresee all cash flows perfectly: cash flowed not 
as foreseen because the economy moved not as planned. Excesses and deficiencies of 
cash occurred at branch offices; these excesses and deficiencies of cash money should 
be managed firstly by the cash reserves held by the branch offices and secondarily by 
accommodation with cash by the higher units in the Gosbank network. If the Gosbank 
headquarter was in short of cash, the new banknotes would be emitted. As Table 1 (B) 
                                                        
9  Kravtsovaya (1983, p. 151-53) showed an example of the cash balance of an corporation. 
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 shows, the closing item of the cash flow balance of the Gosbank headquarter was 
changes in cash money issued. Guarantee was required for banknote issues and the 
council of ministers set the upper limit on issue for each quarter.   
  The credit balance (Table 1 (C)) was another Gosbank's operational document. 
Because of the requirement for guarantee of issue, a banknote issue should be 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in asset of Gosbank, mostly an increase in 
loans given by Gosbank. The cash flow balance and the credit balance were interacted 
in this way; Soviet literature, however, mentioned little about what relation existed 
between the two balances in the actual operation (see Kuschpeta, 1978, pp. 173-175). 
The reason for this ignorance was probably the trust in the division of cash and 
non-cash flows: the permitted amount of wage imposed a ceiling on cash money supply, 
irrelevantly to the amount of loan given by Gosbank. 
  The Soviet authority attached importance to controlling households cash 
demand and, therefore, to the monetary income and outlay balance. The Soviet 
monetary theory defined the amount of cash money that the household sector needed to 
transact goods and services in a period as 'the required amount of money in circulation': 
they claimed that the monetary stability would be attained by supplying cash money to 
the amount no more and no less than this required amount. It was, however, doubtful 
how much information on the required amount of money in circulation or the optimal 
money supply the monetary income and outlay balance could provide. First, the 
prospective balance of monetary income and outlay could be closed in many ways: 
Gosbank complained that it was not clear which should be adjusted, retail sales, 
consumer prices, supply of consumer goods, or wage, to compile the prospective 
monetary income and out lay balance and the cash flow balance for the 3rd five-year 
plan (CBR, 2007c). Second, we needed to quantify the change in the amounts of cash 
money and deposit held by households in order to establish an operational target for 
issue or absorb of money. Third, even if the target for money supply was established 
using the framework of the monetary income and outlay balance, the target seemed far 
from operable because the target might indicate the end-period change in money in 
circulation. The end-period target for money supply gave not much information how 
much money should issue or absorb day by day if we consider regional and temporal 
fluctuation in demand for money. Actually, there existed only all-Union balance of 
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 monetary income and outlay of the household sector until 1959; the republic balances 
were not compiled until then (Kravtsovaya, 1983, p. 143). Even after 1959, the regional 
balances included only the A1 and A2 parts of Table 1(A), because it was not possible 
to forecast the amount of cash transactions within the household sector and the 
magnitude of inter-republic migration of people, goods, and money (Tochil'nikov, 1973, 
p. 284-5; Ischshenko, 1983, p.285). The fact that the republic head offices of Gosbank 
were authorized to supply cash money over the amount stipulated in the prospective 
cash flow balance probably reflected the difficulty in foreseeing demand for money 
(Tochil'nikov, 1973, p. 299).   
  It seemed difficult to deduce the optimal money supply from the monetary 
income and outlay balance; the Soviet authority, nevertheless, seemed to establish a 
target for money supply somehow, because there seemed to be no other criteria which 
could be used for monetary management. Soviet literature was vague at this point how 
to establish an operational target of money supply, while it stressed on the concept of 
the required amount of money in circulation. The money supply target might be 
calculated being based on real national income (see Gregory, 2004, p. 228-9), total 
wage, total monetary income of the household sector, or a mixture of these indicators 
under the assumption of constant velocity of money (Kuschpeta, 1978, pp. 164-6). 
  The next question is how the Soviet authority intended to achieve the money 
supply target. Soviet literature emphasized the role of the limit on banknote issue, that is, 
the direct control on money supply; Soviet literature was, however, ambiguous again 
about how the issue limit functioned as a tool of monetary management. Although 
Soviet literature scarcely discussed the relation between the balances of cash flow and 
monetary income and outlay, it seemed that these balances were closely related in the 
planning process (Ikonnikov, 1954; Tochil'nikov, 1973; Kravtsovaya, 1983). The 
balance of monetary income and outlay gave a rough estimation of changes in money 
supply and this estimation was probably related to establishment of the limit on 
banknote issue. The prospective balance of cash flow was probably compiled so that the 
volume of banknote issue on the balance was kept within the limit. 
  It is, however, doubtful if imposition of a issue limit was an effective 
instrument of monetary management. For Japan, Bank of Japan law, which was enacted 
in 1941 after Japan's transition from the gold-standard to the managed money system, 
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 required guarantee for banknote issue and imposed a limit on banknote issue. Both the 
guarantee requirement and the limitation of banknote issue were abolished when new 
Bank of Japan law was enacted in 1997: the reasons for the abolishment were as follows 
(FSA, 1999). First, it was not possible to establish a method to calculate the optimal 
limit of banknote issue. Second, it was not clear what kind of significance it had to stop 
banknote issue when demand for banknote existed. It had been a customary practice in 
Japan that banknotes had been issued over the limit and the revision of the limit was 
authorized following the fact. 
  If the limit of banknote issue should be kept, the simplest way to achieve it was 
to follow the balances of monetary income and outlay and the cash flow balance as they 
planned. Soviet literature indeed emphasized control of wage payments, the main 
balance item of cash disbursement, and of retail sales, the main balance item of cash 
receipt. The control of wage payments and retail sales, however, could not be an 
effective instrument of monetary management. Gosbank had authority to change neither 
the amount of wage payments nor the production volumes and the prices of consumer 
goods. Moreover, it seemed theoretically groundless and practically infeasible to change 
wage and retail sales in order to keep the planned balances and the limit on banknote 
issue, as it was in Japan.   
  In summary, keeping the limit on banknote issue through controlling wage 
payments and retail sales did not seem an effective method to attain monetary stability, 
even under the institutional framework of the Soviet monetary management. 'The 
balance method of managing money circulation' might be rather a scheme being based 
on the following simple idea: if you absorbed through retail sales so much cash money 
as disbursed through wage payments, cash money could not circulate excessively. The 
idea was logically true and fairly realistic during the time when people accepted any 
consumer goods and services offered. It was, nevertheless, not considered almost at all 
what the monetary authority to do in the cases like that retail sales could not absorb cash 
money sufficiently.   
2.4 Task of the quantitative analysis 
  The Soviet authority intended to achieve monetary stability through keeping 
the limit on banknote issue and controlling wage payments and retail sales. It, however, 
seemed inevitable that the limit on banknote issue and the planned amounts of wage and 
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 retail sales differed from their actual figures, simply because the plan was based on 
forecasts and expectations. Table 2 showed that the actual achievement differed from 
the plan: the Soviet 'planned' economy did not move as it was planned. If the plan and 
the achievement always differed, then adherence to the prospective balances and the 
planned limit on banknote issue would not be very meaningful. Occurrence of monetary 
disequilibria in a sense that the actual figures differed from the planned figures seemed 
inevitable as well. On the other hand, the Soviet economy institutionally excluded the 
information sources such as price indexes, interest rates, and exchange rates to analyze 
the situation of monetary economy and to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of 
policy instruments used
10. Moreover, the institutional settings of the Soviet economy 
circumscribed the possibility of the monetary authority to exercise the policy 
instruments including open-market operation, reserve requirement, and money rates 
operation. In the Soviet administrative command economy, monetary disequilibria 
would be recognized through the phenomena of shortage of consumption goods, 
queuing, increase in household deposits and hoarded money, and thriving black 
markets; the only way to deal with the phenomena might be to change the material 
planning including the amount of wage and the volumes and prices of consumer goods. 
If this was true, money influenced the real economy. 
  In the following sections, we investigate quantitatively the relation between the 
monetary and real sides of the Soviet economy. The opening-up of the Soviet archives 
significantly improved the availability of the Soviet monetary data, the available Soviet 
monetary data are, nevertheless, too scarce to fully investigate the function and 
performance of the Soviet monetary management. We limit our quantitative analysis on 
the following points: 
  First, we inspect the division of cash and non-cash money flows. If this 
division would not be effective, it would mean that a money supply channel, through 
which supply of non-cash funds increased cash money, was still opened. If it would be 
the case, the Soviet monetary management depending solely on control of the cash 
money circulation would not be functioning. 
                                                        
10  Levchuk(1971, pp. 129-30), a Soviet economist, recognized already in the beginning of 1970s 




   Second, we examine if it was possible to forecast demand for cash money. The Soviet 
monetary management relied on keeping the money supply target through limiting banknote issue 
and controlling wage payments and retail sales. The precondition for functioning of this monetary 
management system was that the demand for cash money was more or less predictable. To keep 
inappropriate limits and targets were not meaningful. To access the predictability of demand for 
money, we estimate regression models which probably reflect the Soviet planning custom: It is 
known that a simple rule that an increment was added to the achieved level in the last period was 
extensively adopted in the Soviet planning practice (Birman, 1978; Dyker, 1985, pp. 1-8; Gregory, 
2004, pp. 209-212). 
  Finally, we investigate the relation between money supply and real economy. 
We use Vector Auto-regression (VAR) models and Vector Error Correction (VER) 
models to statistically identify the relation between money supply and the real economy. 
This analysis concerns the predictability of demand for cash money as well; it is, 
however, improbable that the Soviet monetary authority used VAR and VEC models to 
predict demand for cash money.   
3. Data and preliminary analysis 
3.1 Test of stationarity 
  The series we use for the quantitative analysis are nominal net material product 
(NNMP), real net material product (RNMP), price level (PLEV), household monetary 
income (DD), end-year stock of cash money in circulation (NDVO), end-year stock of 
household deposits (DPO), end-year stock of broad money (M1), retail sales (CS), 
end-year stock of bank loan (CRD). All series excluding PLEV and M1 were based on 
the Soviet official statistics and the Soviet archives; a few missing figures were 
estimated. Appendix Table explained in detail the sources and the method of the 
estimations. The price level index, PLEV, is an implicit deflator calculated from NNMP 
and RNMP; the broad money, M1, is the sum of NDVO and DPO. All series started in 
the 1920s; only CRD started from 1949. CRD was used as a proxy of non-cash money 
in the quantitative analysis, because no other series like corporation deposits that could 
represent non-cash money was not available.   
  Appendix Table shows the original figures, while the log-transformed figures 
were used in the quantitative analysis. Hereafter, when we refer to the log-transformed 
level variables, we use the names in the block capital, like RNMP and NNMP. When 
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 the prefix g is added to the block-capital name of a variable like gRNMP and gNNMP, 
it indicates the log-differenced variable. A log-difference figure approximates the 
growth rate of the original level variable.   
  Table 3 shows the results of the unit root test. The ADF and PP statistics 
indicated that all series excluding DD, DPO, and CS were level non-stationary and first 
difference stationary. DD, DPO, and CS showed a change in trend around the war 
period (see Appendix Chart). Regression of DD, DPO, and CS to the time trend showed 
the adjusted R-squared (R
2) higher than 0.99 under the assumptions that the time trend 
changed once in 1945 for DD, in 1940 for DPO, and in 1941 for CS. If a structural 
change in trend exist, the power of the unit root test is lowered. Perron's unit root test 
(1989), which took the structural change in account, was additionally done for DD, 
DPO, and CS. The basis of Perron's test is to perform the ADF test on the detrended 
series. The results of Perron's test showed the ADF statistics of -3.88, -2.61, -4.67 for 
the detrended DD, DPO, and CS, respectively. According to the Perron's table for model 
(C) (Perron, 1989, pp. 1336-7), the detrended DD and DPO were level non-stationary at 
the 5% significance level, while the detrended CS was stationary at the 5% significance 
level. DD and DPO were, therefore, regarded as the difference stationary series, while 
we needed to consider the possibilities that CS was level or difference stationary.   
3.2 Preliminary analysis of the data 
  This sub-section reports the results of preliminary visual inspection on the data, 
focusing on the newly available data, household monetary income (DD) and cash 
money in circulation (NDVO). 
  The nominal series, NNMP, DD, NDVO, and CS, showed the common pattern 
that the increasing trend was strong before the war and weak afterwards (see Appendix 
Chart 1). Table 4 indicates a high correlation between these nominal indicators. 
gNNMP, gDD, gNDVO, and gCS, which represent the changes in the corresponding 
indicators, also showed a common pattern: they had a decreasing trend and relatively 
large fluctuations before the war and showed no clear tendency and relatively small 
fluctuations afterwards (see Appendix Chart 2). gNDVO appeared at first sight to move 
somewhat differently from the other series; gNDVO, however, also shared the common 
pattern, if we excluded the large changes caused by the 1924 monetary reform, the 1947 
monetary reform, and the 1960 denomination.   
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   DD and NNMP appeared to move closely together; the ratio of DD to NNMP, 
DD/NNMP, however, changed (Chart 1). In the periods before the war, DD/NNMP 
fluctuated largely: the ratio sharply increased during 1925 to 1932, then it sharply 
decreased during 1933 to 1935. DD/NNMP sharply increased again in 1942 and the 
ratio stayed over one during 1943 to 1945. DD/NNMP can be larger than one, because 
DD includes withdrawals of hoarded money and deposits. Appendix Chart 1 indicated 
household deposits (DPO) decreased, while cash money in circulation (NDVO) 
increased during 1941 to 1943. It was probably true that DD/NNMP was at the high 
level at that time; it, nevertheless, seemed implausible that DD/NNMP remained higher 
than one in the three consecutive years. We need to consider that the data reliability was 
low during the war time. The fluctuations of DD/NNMP were small after 1950. We can, 
nevertheless, relatively clearly see changes in the tendency: a decreasing tendency in 
1950s, an increasing tendency from 1960 to 1975, a stagnating or decreasing tendency 
from the latter half of 1970s to 1985, and a sharp increase from 1985 to the end of the 
Soviet system. 
  The ratios of cash money in circulation to household monetary income 
(NDVO/DD) and to nominal net material product (NDVO/NNMP) moved similarly as 
DD and NNMP showed a common pattern of the movements. An increasing trend in 
NDVO/DD was seen since the latter half of the 1930s. The increasing trend was 
interrupted at the 1947 monetary reform, at the 1961 denomination, and in the years 
around 1980; the influences of these events, however, did not last. NDVO/NNMP 
moved slightly differently from NDVO/DD before 1945; NDVO/NNMP and 
NDVO/DD showed the similar increasing tendency after 1960.   
  The ratio of NDVO to real net material product (NDVO/RNMP) showed an 
increasing tendency before 1941; the ratio, however, stagnated during 1932 to 1936. 
These movements of NDVO/RNMP matched the development of monetary policy in 
the period described in Sub-section 2.1. NDVO/RNMP outstood during 1941 to 1947, 
reflecting the war-time inflation. NDVO/RNMP sharply decreased after the 1947 
monetary reform and continued to decrease to 1960. The tendency turned upward after 
1961; in the latter half of the Perestroika period, NDVO/RNMP increased at a speed 




 Chart 2 compared NDVO, DPO, Broad Money (M1), and Bank Loan (CRD). DPO was 
almost one tenth of NDVO around 1930, exceeded NDVO in 1954, and was about three 
times larger than NDVO in the final years of the Soviet system: DPO increased much 
faster than NDVO. The overall tendencies were, nevertheless, common in NDVO and 
DPO, except for a large decrease in NDVO at the 1947 monetary reform. DPO showed 
a small increase in 1947: this may support the Soviet authority's claim that the 
magnitude of the confiscation of household deposits at the 1947 monetary reform was 
small. Because the patterns of the movements in NDVO and DPO generally matched, 




 Chart 3 showed the ratios of CRD to NDVO, to DPO, and to M1. CRD/NDVO was 
around 0.6 and almost unchanged during 1950 to the middle of 1970s, excluding a 
decrease in 1954 and a pinnacle in 1960. The decrease in 1954 may be related to the 
introduction of differentiated loan terms; the decrease in NDVO at the 1961 
denomination may cause the increase in CRD/NDVO in 1960. CRD/NDVO started to 
increase in 1975, showed a sharp increase in 1981, remained at a high level during 1981 
to 1985, then decreased rapidly after 1986. Chart 1 indicates that CRD/NDVO increased 
in 1981 because CRD grew faster than NDVO in 1981. On the other hand, the 
decreasing tendency in CRD/NDVO after 1986 reflected that NDVO grew rapidly in the 
period while CRD decreased. The cause for the different movements between NDVO 
and CRD after 1980 was not clear. The ratio of bank loan to broad money (CRD/M1) 
had a decreasing tendency except for a small rise around 1980: this was the 
consequence of that DPO grew faster than CRD after 1950 excluding a few years (see 
Appendix Chart 2). The visual inspection suggested that the division of cash and 
non-cash flows was effective in the sense that CRD did not appear to increase NDVO 
and M1. We quantitatively inspect this point in the following section. 
As discussed in 2.3, the Soviet authority seemed to pursue for keeping the 
growth rate of cash money supply (gNDVO) within the range from zero to the growth 
rate of household monetary income (gDD). Keeping gNDVO at zero means that 
Gosbank collects all cash money disbursed from Gosbank in a period within the same 











Δ⋅ = Δ , 
where Δx denotes the time differential of the before-log-transformed variable x: xt-xt-1 
and Δx/xt-1≈gx. Setting gNDVO at gDD, therefore, means to supply additional cash 
money (ΔNDVO), considering the money circulation velocity defined as 
DDt-1/NDVOt-1 and the increase in DD (ΔDD).  
Household deposits (DPO) is an important factor to control cash money. An 
increase in DPO was a redemption of cash money, while DPO was easily monetized. 
There was no doubt that the Soviet authority was cautious with increase in DPO (see 
CBR, 2008), while Soviet literature gave little information on how to control household 
deposits and how to deal with unintended changes in household deposits. Whatever 
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 intention the Soviet authority had, it seemed difficult for the Soviet authority to manage 
household deposits. There was no reliable and effective policy instrument to control 
households deposit excluding the de-facto confiscation at the 1947 monetary reform and 
the de-facto forced purchase of government bonds by households that existed until 1957 
(see Sychev and Boldyrev, 1984, p. 250)
11. If control of household deposits was 
difficult, control of cash money was also difficult. 
Chart 4 shows the ratios of ΔNDVO and ΔM1 to DD (ΔNDVO/DD and 
ΔM1/DD) and the ratios of the growth rates of NDVO and M1 to the growth rate of DD 
(gNDVO/gDD and gM1/gDD). Note that ΔNDVO and ΔM1 are the flow amounts. 
ΔNDVO/DD seemed to fluctuate largely before the 1947 monetary reform. After 1947 
until the latter half of the Perestroika period, ΔNDVO/DD appeared to fall in a certain 
narrow range. On the other hand, ΔM1/DD increased exceeding ΔNDVO/DD after 
1947: this reflected that the weight of household deposits in M1 had rapidly increased 
after 1950. ΔM1/DD dropped in 1964 and in 1980 to 1982. The causes of these decrease 
were not clear. 
Both gNDVO/gDD and gM1/gDD appeared fairly stable excluding the large 
changes in 1933, 1941, 1947, 1953 (only in gM1/gDD), 1960, 1963-64 (only in 
gM1/gDD), and 1970 (only in gNDVO/gDD). gM1/gDD varied larger than 
gNDVO/gDD during 1953 to 1964; it seemed more stable than gNDVO/gDD after 1965. 
The simple average and the standard deviation of gNDVO/gDD in the period from 1927 
to 1990 excluding 1941 and 1947 were 1.12 and 1.29, respectively, while the simple 
average and the standard deviation of gM1/gDD in the same period were 1.49 and 1.30 
respectively. The cause of the large change in gNDVO/gDD and gM1/gDD was related 
to the economic crisis at that time in 1933, to the war in 1941, to the monetary reform 
and denomination in 1947 and 1961. In 1964, DPO had changed large; NDVO did not. 
On the other hand, NDVO changed and DPO did not in 1970. The causes of these 
changes in 1964 and 1970 were not clear.   
  The visual inspection on ΔNDVO/DD and gNDVO/gDD showed that they 
were fairly stable except for the sporadic large changes; the cash money stock, NDVO, 
                                                        
11  The year-end amount of government bonds hold by households was 5.7, 6.6, 4.6, and 3.4 times 




 nevertheless, grew more rapidly than household monetary income, DD. The simple 
average of the ratio of the growth rates of cash money stock and household monetary 
income, gNDVO/gDD, from 1927 to 1990 was 1.12. gNDVO, was under zero only a 
few years and the simple average of the annual growth rates of NDVO (not 
log-transformed) from 1927 to 1990 was 11.3%. If the Soviet authority intended to keep 
the growth rate of cash money stock (gNDVO) in the range from zero to the growth rate 
of household monetary income (gDD), the intention was not realized. 
4. Results of Quantitative Analysis 
4.1 Division of cash and non-cash money flows 
  To examine the effectiveness of the division between cash and non-cash money 
flows, Vector Auto-regression (VAR) and Vector Error Correction (VEC) models 
including two variables, cash money in circulation (NDVO) and bank loan (CRD), were 
estimated. It would be better to discuss the effectiveness of the division in a wider 
model of interactions between the monetary and real economies; it was, however, not 
possible mostly because the CRD series started in 1949. From the econometric 
perspective, the shortness of the series inevitably reduce the power of cointegration test 
and the reliability of VAR and VEC models. From the economics perspective, the 
shortness of the CRD series may not be a serious problem if we limit our analysis to the 
division between cash and non-cash flows, because the institution of the division 
between cash and non-cash flow was established after the 1930/32 credit reform.   
  First, gNDVO-gCRD two variables VAR models were estimated. Setting the 
max lag length at 5, all lag order criteria, LR, FPE, AIC, SC, and HQ, indicated the lag 
order of 1 for the models including the constant term and the lag order of 2 for the 
model without the constant term. Both VAR models showed a poor fitness: only the 
constant terms and the own auto-regression terms were significant at the 5% level in 
each regression equation of both VAR models. Granger causality test on the VAR 
model with the lag order of 1 showed that Granger causality from gCRD to gNDVO 
was significant at 10% level; the Ganger causality from gNDVO to gCRD was rejected. 
Granger causality test on the VAR model with the lag order of 2 showed that gCRD and 
gNDVO did not Granger-cause each other.   
  The VAR model with the lag order of 1 showed a possibility that non-cash 
23/57 
 
 money influenced cash. The impulse response analysis of the VAR model with the lag 
order 1 indicated, however, that gCRD inversely influenced gNDVO: an increase 
(decrease) in gCRD caused a decrease (increase) in gNDVO. The cumulative response 
of gNDVO three periods after a one standard-deviation shock in gCRD was -0.022 with 
Cholesky order from gNDVO to gCRD and -0.025 with Cholesky order from gCRD to 
gNDVO. The inverse relation between cash and non-cash money is not the relation we 
suppose: the influence of gCRD on gNDVO that the VAR model with the lag order of 1 
identified was probably reflect the fact that NDVO and CRD moved in the directions 
opposite to each other in the 1980s (see Chart 3). 
Because both NDVO and CRD are first-difference stationery, they can be 
co-integrated: that is, NDVO and CRD can be linearly combined with co-integration 
vectors to form stationery composite variables. A model, which added composite 
variables to the original VAR model, is a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model. The 
composite variables can be interpreted as that they represent the short-term deviations 
from the long-term relations between the original variables; the composite variables, 
therefore, called the error correction terms. If a statistically significant error correction 
term is omitted, the model is underspecified and the estimation results of the model does 
not have consistency.   
Johansen test showed that no co-integration vector existed for the VAR model 
with the lag order of 1, while both trace statistic and max eigenvalue statistic of 
Johansen test showed that the existence of one co-integration vector at the 5% 
significance level for the VAR model with the lag order of 2. From this result, the VEC 
model with the lag order 2 including one error correction term was estimated. The VEC 
model showed poor fitness; only the error correction term in the gNDVO equation and 
the own first order atuo-regression term in the gCRD equation were significant at the 
5% level. Granger causality test indicated no significant Granger causality between 
gNDVO and gCRD. Note that the error correction terms are not the subject of Granger 
causality test in a VEC model.   
The estimation results of the cash money - bank loan VAR and VEC models 
suggested that there were no statistically significant relation between cash money and 




 4.2 Predictability of demand for cash money 
The monetary authority should know how demand for cash money were related 
to the other variables and be able to more or less accurately forecast changes demand 
for cash money. From discussion on ‘the balance method of cash money management’, 
the Soviet authority probably used the variables that appeared in the balance of 
monetary income and some other variables such as nominal and real net material 
product to forecast demand for cash money. Although the available data were annual 
data, the time scope of the Soviet monetary management might be shorter than one year. 
We assume two cases where the Soviet authority used information in the previous 
period and in the same period: this may contribute to coping with the shorter time scope 
of the Soviet authority. 
Table 5 showed the estimation results of the regression models of demand for 
cash money: for all estimations in the table, the figures of gNDVO for 1947, 1948, 1960, 
and 1961 were excluded to avoid influences of the large jumps caused by the 1947 
monetary reform and the 1961 denomination.   
Models of (a) to (f) in Panel (A) regressed gNDVO to the information in the 
previous period. Our purpose is to assess the predictability of demand for cash money; 
Model (a), therefore, includes all candidate variables so that the fitness, the adjusted 
R-squared (R
2), was as high as possible. One or more variables of the explanatory 
variables in Model (a) were dropped in the other estimation equations: R
2 of the other 
models are smaller than that of model (a) if we ignore possible small increases in R
2 
caused by changes in the degree of freedom.   
The highest R
2 was 0.16 in the models of (a) to (f): this means that the forecast 
models using information in the previous period could accounted for at best only 16% 
of changes in demand for cash money. In the models of (a) to (c), only the trend and the 
dummy terms were statistically significant at 5% level
12. The R
2 of the models of (d) to 
(g) for the post-war period was smaller than that of the models of (a) to (c) for the entire 
period. Moreover, only Model (e) was significant at 5% as the model in whole (see 
F-value). Model (e) included bank loan (gCRD), household monetary income (gDD), 
                                                        
12  Other settings of the dummy and trend terms were tried for the models of (a) to (c). Their results 





 and consumer aales (gCS) as the explanatory variables: only the constant term and gDD 
were significant at 5% level. Model (f), which included gDD and gCS and, therefore, 
represented the basic structure of the monetary income and outlay balance, was not 
significant as the model in whole. 
Models of (g) to (k) in Panel A of Table 5 regressed gNDVO to the information 
in the concurrent period. The highest R
2 was 0.24 for Model (g) that included all 
candidate explanatory variables. Model (h), which represented the basic structure of the 
monetary income and outlay balance, showed a low R
2, 0.22. Only gDD in the 
explanatory variables of Model (h) was significant. Models of (i) to (k) for the post-war 
period showed relatively high R
2; the significant explanatory variable, however, was 
only gDD in all equations of (i) to (j). Model (k), which included only gDD as the 
explanatory variable, showed a R
2 of 0.47: this value of R
2 was as high as that of Model 
(i). This result suggested that it was sufficient to use only the information of household 
monetary income in the current period to predict the current demand for cash money: 
Household monetary income (gDD), the factor of cash money disbursement, influenced 
demand for cash money, while consumer sales (gCS), the factor of money redemption, 
did not. Model (h) for the entire period showed the similar characteristic. 
  Panel (B) of Table 5 indicate the estimation results of regression of gNDVO to 
the level variables: DD, RNMP, and CS. The level variables were non-stationary; the 
Soviet authority, however, might use the level variables. Only model (g) for the entire 
period was significant at 5% level as a model in whole; R
2 was, however, low and DD 
was not significant.    . 
  Table 5 showed that it was difficult to predict changes in demand for cash 
money using the variables in the current and previous periods. It was probable that the 
Soviet authority intended to control money circulation using the targets related to the 
volume or the growth rate of cash money supply; it, however, did not seem very 
meaningful if demand for money was not predictable. 
4.3 Money supply and real economy 
  The purpose of the analysis in this sub-section is to statistically examine if any 
relation existed between money supply and real economy; the policy operability of the 
variables and the possible structural relations between the variables which the Soviet 




4.3.1 Money-Income-Real Production VAR model 
  We estimate a VAR model including cash money in circulation (gNDVO), 
household monetary income (gDD), and real net material product (RNMP) as the 
explanatory variables. The results of the analyses in Sub-section 4.2 suggested that it 
would little improve the VAR model to include more explanatory variables. It was 
worth to consider to include price index, PLEV, as an explanatory variable or to deflate 
NDVO and DD by PLEV; this settings, however, were not adopted. It was doubtful if 
PLEV could be a proxy for consumer price index because of the methodology to 
calculate PLEV. We can assume that DD includes the price factor. Consumer sales (CS), 
which was the absorption factor of cash money, was not included in the explanatory 
variables. This is firstly because the analysis in the subsection 4.2 showed that CS little 
influenced cash money circulation and DD and NDVO can approximate the absorption 
of cash money (DD - NDVO ≈ CS). It would be desirable to include bank loan (CRD) 
in the VAR model to represent the relation between money and real economy; CRD was, 
however, excluded. The analysis in Sub-section 4.1 showed the division between cash 
and non-cash flows was effective. Moreover, the CRD series are short: the accuracy of 
the estimation is reduced if we include CRD in the VAR model. The figures of gNDVO 
for 1947, 1948, 1960, and 1961 were excluded as they were in Sub-section 4.2.   
  From a visual inspection of the variables (see Appendix Chart 2), introduction 
of a dummy variable which distinguish between the periods before and after the war 
was considered; the dummy variable was, however, not statistically significant. On the 
other hand, it was difficult to decide to include a trend term or not; both cases with and 
without trend term, therefore, were considered.   
  For the model without trend term, two of the five test statistics of the lag order 
test indicated the lag orders of 1 and 3, each; the other test statistics indicated the lag 
order of 5. The lag order of 5 seemed too long because we used annual data; it, however, 
might be possible that the lag order of 5 related to some five-year plan cycle for the 
Soviet case. The lag exclusion test on the VAR model with the lag order of 5 indicated 
that the 3rd, 4th, and 5th order lags were not jointly significant at the 5% level: The lag 
exclusion test on the VAR model with 1st, 2nd, and 5th lags indicated that the 5th order 
lag was not jointly significant at the 5% level. From these results, three cases of the lag 
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 orders, the lag order of 1, the lag order of 3, and the 1st and 5th lags, were adopted for 
the VAR model without trend term.   
  For the VAR model with the trend term, four test statistics of the lag order test 
indicated the lag order of 2 and the other statistics the lag order of 1; a VAR model with 
the trend term with the lag order of 2 was, therefore, chosen.   
  Chart 5 showed the results of Granger causality test on the estimated VAR 
models: only the VAR model of the lag order of 3 indicated (Lag3NT) a Granger causal 
relation from gNDVO to gRNMP at the 5% significant level. Table 6 showed the results 
of the impulse response analysis of the VAR models: the cumulative response after 
three periods caused by one standard-deviation shock in a variable were indicated. 
Cholesky ordering was set as from gRNMP, to gDD, and to NDVO, considering the 
possible influence path from money to real production
13.  Table 6 supported the results 
of Granger causality test: a shock in gNDVO reduced gRNMP only in the model with 
the lag order of 3 (Lag3NT)
14. On the other hand, a shock in gRNMP reduced both gDD 
and gNDVO in all cases. This inverse influences from gNDVO to gRNMP in the model 
with the lag order of 3 and form gRNMP to gNDVO in all models were not regarded as 
an usual relation between money and real production. 
  From the analysis of the VAR models, we found that money supply did not 
influence real production except for the model with the lag order of 3. The influence 
from money to real production in the model with the lag order of 3 was a relation which 
an increase (decrease) in money supply leads to a decrease (increase) in real production. 
We found that real production influenced money supply in all models; this relation was 
again an inverse relation. The inverse relation between money supply and real 
production probably reflects the fact that deterioration in real economy and increase in 
money supply occurred at the same time during the inflation in the periods of the early 
1930s, the war, and Perestroika.   
 
4.3.2 Money - Income - Real Production VEC model 
  DD, RNMP, and NDVO are difference stationary; we need, therefore, to 
                                                        
13  Influences of changes in Cholesky order were negligible in this case. 
14  The shock in gNDVO caused changes in gRNMP which were too small to present in a number 
with two digits after decimal.   
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 consider VEC models of DD, RNMP, and NDVO. We assume from the analysis in 
4.3.1 the following four cases: (1) the lag order of 1, (2) the lag order of 2, (3) the lag 
order of 3, and (4) the lags of 1 and 5, and perform Johansen test on each case. Both 
trace statistic and max eigenvalue statistic for Cases (1) to (3) showed the existence of 
one co-integration vector at the 5% significance level, while both statistics for Case (4) 
rejected existence of co-integration vector at the significance 5% level. 
  Because the VEC models used the level variables, introduction of a dummy 
variable (D2346) that was 1 in the years from 1923 through to 1946 and 0 in the other 
years was considered to identify the periods before and after the 1947 monetary reform. 
For the model with the lag order of 1, D2346 was significant at the 5% level in the 
gRNMP equation and not significant in the other equations; we, therefore, estimated the 
models of the lag order of 1 both with D2346 and without D2346. For the models with 
the lag orders of 2 and 3, D2346 was not significant at 5% level in all equations. 
  Chart 6 shows the results of Granger causality test on the estimated VEC 
models. The VEC model with the lag order of 1 without D2346 showed that gNDVO 
Granger-caused gRNMP at the 10% significance level, while the VEC model with the 
lag order of 1 with D2346 showed that gRNMP Granger-caused gNDVO at the 10% 
significance level. The models with the lag orders of 2 and 3 showed that gNDVO 
Ganger-caused gRNMP at the 1% significance level. Granger causality test suggested 
that cash money influenced real economy. 
  Table 7 showed the results of the impulse response analysis of the VEC 
models: the results showed that a shock in NDVO inversely influenced RNMP in the 
VEC models as same as in the Money - Income - Real Production VAR models. RNMP 
also influenced NDVO inversely: an increase (decrease) in real production caused a 
decrease (increase) in cash money. Note that the results showed the impulse responses 
between the level variables in the VEC models. There were only a few years when the 
level of NDVO or RNMP actually decreased (see Appendix Table, Appendix Chart 1, 
and Appendix Chart 2). The inverse relation between NDVO and RNMP probably 
reflected that real production decreased during the inflation periods before the 1947 
monetary reform. The Perestroika period was not the case, because the levels of NDVO 




   The error correction terms in the VEC models can be interpreted as the long 
term relations between the level variables of NDVO, DD, and RNMP: the estimated 
coefficient of the error correction term indicates the adjustment coefficient, that is the 
ratio of adjustment within a period to the deviation from the long-term relation. Table 
8(A) indicates the adjustments coefficients of the VEC models. An adjustment 
coefficient should be within the rage of -1 to 0, if a VEC model actually represent an 
error correction behavior. All estimated coefficients were in the range; the estimated 
values, however, seemed too small. The inverse of an adjustment coefficient indicates 
the number of period needed to eliminate a deviation occurred in a certain period. The 
adjustment period calculated from the estimated coefficient in Table 8 was 6 years in 
the shortest case of gNDVO in the Lag3ND model and 34 years in the longest cases of 
gRNMP in the Lag1ND model and gNDVO in the Lag1WD model. The adjustment 
period of 6 years seems too long for a relation between money and real production. 
  Table 8(B) shows the coefficients of the level variables in the long-term 
relations (the error correction terms) that are transformed to put NDVO at the left-hand 
side. Because the variables are log-transformed, the absolute values of the figures in 
Table 8 (B) indicate the elasticity of NDVO to DD and RNMP in their long-term 
relations. The values and signs of the estimated coefficients varied according to the 
model. In the Lag1ND and Lag1WD models, the estimated coefficient suggested that 
NDVO and RNMP moved in the same direction, while NDVO and DD moved in the 
opposite directions. In the Lag3ND model, NDVO moved parallel to DD, but inversely 
to RNMP. It is difficult to suppose that cash money supply moves inversely to nominal 
monetary income and real production. Only the Lag2ND model, where NDVO, DD, and 
RNMP move in the same direction, probably indicated an appropriate relation between 
NDVO, DD, and RNMP. 
  The analysis of the error correction terms in the VEC models indicated that it 
was difficult to interpret that the VEC models represented the behavior of the Soviet 
authority. The VEC models, nevertheless, statistically reflected the relations between 
the variables. The periods when cash money in circulation (NDVO) moved opposite to 
real net material product (RNMP) were the Industrialization period and the war-time 
inflation period only: increases in money and deterioration in real production indeed 
occurred at the same time in these periods. In the other periods, influences between cash 
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 money and real production were probably weak in both directions, if they existed. Table 
11 shows the results of the variance decomposition of the VEC models: change in 
NDVO accounted for a few percentage of a change in RNMP in all model settings.   
 
  The estimation results of the VEC models suggested that cash money supply 
inversely influenced real production in the inflation periods and there were no 
significant relation between cash money and real production in the other periods.   
5. Discussion 
  We discuss economic meaning of the results of the quantitative analysis and 
the future direction of research in this section. 
  We analyzed the Soviet monetary management historically and institutionally 
and confirmed that the Soviet authority basically pursued for monetary stability. The 
Soviet authority seemed to intend to manage money circulation with some volume 
target of cash money supply. How to establish the target and how to achieve the target 
were, however, not clear: the Soviet authority seemed to rely on the limit on bank notes 
issue and securing it by control on wage payments and consumer sales, assuming that 
the institutional division between the cash and non-cash money flows were effective. 
Soviet literature did not present the method and the procedure to decide the issue limit. 
Moreover, Soviet literature fell silent about policy instruments to manage excessive 
money, although actual money supply seemed to inevitably differ from expected money 
supply.  
  Being based on the results of the historical and institutional analysis, we 
quantitatively analyzed the effectiveness of the division of cash and non-cash money 
flows which was the cornerstone of the Soviet monetary management. This is followed 
by the analysis of the predictability of demand for cash money. Unless demand for cash 
money was more or less predictable, limiting supply of cash money was not very 
meaningful. Finally, we statistically examined how cash money supply related to real 
economy. 
  The results of the quantitative analyses showed the following: First, the 
division of cash and non-cash money flows was effective. Second, it was difficult to 
predict demand for cash money from information in the previous and the current periods. 
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 It was doubtful that the Soviet monetary management, which was based on the limit of 
banknote issue, functioned effectively. Indeed, the actual changes in cash money supply 
did not seem to follow simple rules of cash money supply, although some obscure upper 
limit of cash money supply seemed to exist. Third, cash money supply and real 
production influenced not strongly each other. The analysis suggested that cash money 
supply inversely influenced real production; this inverse relation was probably a 
statistical reflection of the inverse relation between money and real production during 
the inflations in the Industrialization, the war, and the Perestroika periods. 
  The results of our study seems consistent with Gorssman's theory on the Soviet 
money (Grossman, 1963; Grossman, 1966) and the recent results of micro economic 
analysis using Soviet archives by Gregory and others (Grgory, 2001: Gregory, 2004, 
Gregory and Harrison, 2005). The Soviet monetary management was probably far less 
functional than one might imagine. The monetary management seemed to depend solely 
on control of wage payments; the effectively of limiting banknote issue seemed highly 
doubtful. It was more or less true that wage payments was only the pathway to supply 
cash money because the institutional division of cash and non-cash money flows 
probably worked. The control of wage payments set a vague ceiling on cash money 
supply; it was, however, unpredictable where money supply fell around the ceiling. 
None could foresee how the production plan of consumer goods would be achieved, 
how consumers reacted to consumer goods offered, how much it was allowed to pay 
wage over the planned limit, how many and to what degree bad performed enterprises 
were bailed out, and so on. These were determined as a result of numerous and 
uncoordinated administrative and political decisions. This is reflected by our finding 
that the level of cash money showed a strong correlation with the other level variables 
and changes in cash money fell in a certain range, while demand for cash money was 
unpredictable. 
  We can conclude that it is not appropriate to explain the role of money in the 
Soviet administrative command economy with either passive or active money concept. 
Rather, the fundamental problem of the Soviet monetary management was that the role 
of money could not be explained either passive or active money concept (see Grossman, 
1966, p.235). Money mattered in the Soviet economy (see Gregory, pp. 218-222); this 
was the very reason why the Soviet authority pursued for monetary stability. What they 
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 could not do was to construct an effective institution of monetary management. It was 
true that influence of money on resource allocation was weak in the Soviet economy as 
our quantitative analysis showed; the monetary disequilibria caused by defects of 
material plans, nevertheless, caused shortage, queuing, excess hoard of money, rapid 
increase in deposits, expansion of black markets, and circulation of money surrogate 
including hard currencies. It was ironical that material planning was partially successful 
to maintain the value of ruble: Ruble's having its value meant that ruble had power to 
move economic resources. On the other hand, under the Soviet command administrative 
economy where price index, interest rates, and foreign exchange rate were 
institutionally eliminated, it was difficult to detect monetary disequilibria and to 
understand their economic meanings: the Soviet institutional settings also deprived the 
monetary authority the monetary policy instruments. Changes in political and 
administrative decision and material planning were necessary to eliminate monetary 
disequilibria. There did not seem to exist an automatic and economic mechanism to 
adjust monetary disequilibria; non-existence of systematic relation between money and 
real production that our research showed probably reflected this situation. If monetary 
disequilibrium was serious, then political and administrative measures to eliminate the 
disequilibrium might be also serious. Ignoring the risk of political and social unrests, it 
was easy to eliminate monetary disequilibrium: through raising consumer prices, 
decreasing wages, increasing tax, or confiscating financial assets as it was done in the 
1947 monetary reform. When none expected that vigorous measures lead to a recovery 
from an economic disequilibrium and to sustainable economic development, it was 
almost impossible to exert the measures.   
  The result of this research made it difficult to consider the Soviet 
administrative command economy as a complete economic system that could substitute 
the market economy system: the problem of monetary management seemed to be left 
unsolved in the Soviet system. We can suppose that the Soviet system did not intend to 
solve the problem from the beginning. If it is true, the question should be asked is this: 
why such Soviet system existed until 1990 and was not collapsed before then? The 
Soviet system had still many political, social and economic mysteries to be cleared. 
  The availability of data limited severely our analysis: the important data 
including the balance of payments, the balance sheets of the banks, the financial flows 
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 between the state budget and the banking system, the disbursement and repayment of 
bank loans may sleep in the Soviet archives. If data on expectations and prospects of the 
Soviet authority were available, we can deepen our analysis greatly and construct more 
sophisticated models. The more data become available, the further researches on the 
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Table 1ç Models of the balances 
 
(A) Balance of Household Monetary Income and Outlay 
 
Income Outlay 
A1. From state and cooperative corporations 
and organizations 
A2. To state and cooperative corporations 
and organizations 
Wages  Purchases of goods and services 
Payments to kolkhoz members  Mandatory payments 
Sales of private agricultural products  Other payments   
Pensions and other benefits  Savings 
Receipts from financial institutions   
Other incomes   
B1. Income from trade within the Household 
sector 
B2. Outlay for trade within the household 
sector 
C. Total income (=A1+B1)  D. Total outlay(=A2+B2) 
  Chang in cash money held by households 
(=C-D)(+/-) 
 
(B) Cash Flow Balance of Gosbank 
 
Receipt Disbursement 
Proceeds of goods and services  Wages 
Transportation fares  State procurements of agricultural products 
Communal transportation fares  Payments from kolkhoz accounts 
Housing rents and public utility charges  Pensions, benefits, and insurance claims 
Receipts of the service sector  Loans to households 
Taxes  Travel allowances and other expenses 
Receipts on kolkhoz accounts  Payments to postal offices 
Receipts on housing cooperative accounts  Payments to saving institutions 
Receipts of postal services   
Receipts of saving institutions   
Total receipt  Total disbursement 
Withdrawal banknotes from the reserve fund
(banknote issue) 
Transfer of banknotes to the reserve funds 
(banknote redemption) 
 
(C) Consolidated short-term credit plan of Gosbank (Abridged) 
 
Sources Utilization 
1. Funds and profits of Gosbank  1. Credit against goods 
2. Deposits of the state budget  2. Credit against seasonal and surplus stocks 
3. Deposits of the economic sector  3. Credit against documents 
4. Deposits of current accouts  4. Settlement credit 
5. Household savings  5. Credit for covering temporary expenses 
6. Deposits of financial institutions  6. Credit granted for wage payments 
7. Money in circulation  7.Overdue credits 
8. Other sources  8.Outstanding credits   
  9.Reserves of the Gosbank presidium 




Sources: Ikonnikov(1954), Tochil'nikov (1973), Kuschepeta(1978), Sigg (1981), Kravtsovaya 




Table 2 Achievements of Annual Economic Plans:1966-88 (%) 
 
  Growth rate Achievement
1) 
 plan actual average max min  s.  d.   
Real Income per capita  4.2 3.7 86.9 124.1 4.8 22.9 
National income, used  5.1 4.6 89.5 141.7 46.5 20.7 
Industrial labor productivity
2) 4.6 4.4 96.9 140.0 51.1 23.3 
Total wages
3) 4.2 5.1 123.2 200.0 87.2 20.8 
Monthly wage in industry
4) 2.7 3.7 140.2 368.4 93.8 60.2 
Sales of state and cooperative trade
5) 5.6 5.8 103.5 177.8 50.0 24.0 
Source: The annual economic plans and the reports of fulfillments of the annual economic plan for 1966 
to 1988 published in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. 
Notes: 
1. The achievement was defined as: achievement = 100 × planned growth rate / actual growth rate. 
The average is the simple average of the annual achievements. 
2. The figures for 1968, 1973, and 1987 were not available. 
3. The figures for 1969 and 1970 were not available. 
4. The figures for 1966, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1985, and 1986 were not available. 





Table 3 Unit root test 
 
Series     Level    1st  difference 
     ADF    PP    ADF  PP 
     t L    T   t L t 
RNMP TI   -1.91 1   -1.52    ***-5.51 0 ***-5.41
 I   -2.44 1    *-2.77    ***-4.96 0 ***-4.88
 No   2.47 1   3.88    ***-3.56 0 ***-3.37
NNMP TI   -1.27 9   -2.72   -1.15 8 ***-5.93
 I    0.14 9   ***-5.71   ***-4.41 8 ***-4.59
 No   1.88 9   3.56    ***-4.87 8 ***-3.09
PLEV TI   -2.05 9   -1.58   -1.50 8 ***-5.01
 I    **-3.22 8   -2.39   -1.16 8 ***-4.92
 No   1.40 10   1.55    -0.82 9 ***-4.69
DD TI   **-3.72 2   **-3.69    *-3.26 2 ***-6.07
 I   0.43 1    ***-5.05    *-2.88 2 ***-5.09
 No   1.68 3   3.68    ***-2.03 2 ***-3.37
NDVO TI   ***-4.41 0    -3.08   ***-8.87 0 ***-8.97
 I   *-2.75 0    -1.83    ***-8.85 0 ***-8.89
 No   3.17 0   3.24    ***-7.66 0 ***-7.65
M1 TI   -3.11 0   -3.10    ***-8.25 0 ***-8.26
 I   -1.55 0   -1.59    ***-8.22 0 ***-8.22
 No   3.36 0   3.36    ***-6.89 0 ***-6.96
DPO TI    *-3.20 1   ***-4.19   ***-4.83 0 ***-4.70
 I    -1.98 1   ***-3.58   ***-4.61 0 ***-4.50
 No   2.14 1   3.15    ***-3.30 0 ***-3.18
CS TI   ***-4.466 1    **-3.72    ***-3.58 0 ***-4.61
 I   -2.33 4    **-3.20    ***-4.20 3 ***-4.44
 No   2.63 2   3.19    ***-3.58 0 ***-3.41
CRD TI   1.74 0   1.21    **-4.17 0 ***-4.38
 I   -1.35 2   -2.31   -2.16 1 ***-4.00
 No   1.05 2   3.75    *-1.91 1 ***-3.16
 
Notations: see Appendix Table for the series; ADF: Augmented Ditcky-Fullaer statistics; PP: 
Philips-Perron statistics; t: t-value, TI: with trend and interception; I: intercept only; No: without 
trend and intercept; L: automatically selected lag length for ADF test; ***: significant at 1% level; 





Table 4 Correlation coefficients between the nominal level variables 
 
  DD CS  NNMP 
NDVO  0.981 0.959  0.970 
DD   0.988  0.996 
CS     0.995 
 
Notations: see Appendix Table for the names of variables. 




Table 5ç Predictability of demand for cash 
 
(A) dependent variable: gNDVO 
lagged variables of     Period  C 
gNDVO gDD gRNMP gPLEV gCS gCRD
Dmy R
2 DW F 
(a) 31-90  0.10 -0.08 -0.03  0.16 -0.21 -0.25 0.15 0.15 2.04 *2.53
(52)  †4.43  -0.52 -0.14 0.50 -0.71 -1.31 †3.22
(b) 31-90  0.10 -0.05  0.17 -0.23 -0.26 0.15 0.16 2.17 *2.99
(53)  †5.14  -0.25 0.56 -0.78 -1.36 †3.16
(c) 31-90  0.11 -0.05  -0.15 0.11 0.16 2.20 †4.53
(56)  †6.22 -0.33  -1.23 †3.23
(d) 52-90  0.05 0.00 0.92 0.07 0.15 -0.07 -0.12 0.00 2.26 1.01
(36)  1.55 0.02 1.33 0.14 0.28 -0.12 -0.87
(eʣ 51-90  0.06 1.14  -0.34 -0.16 0.11 2.24 *2.60
(38)  *2.09 * 2.11  -0.71 -1.48
(f) 49-90  0.09 -0.08  0.20 0.00 1.44 0.09
(40)  †4.32  -0.32 0.41
    
  current variables of   
 
Period C 
  gDD gRNMP gPLEV gCS gCRD
Dmy R
2 DW F 
(g) 30-90  0.08 0.33  -0.02 0.26 -0.13 0.06 0.24 2.16 †4.39
(54)  †4.47  1.93 -0.08 0.99 -0.73 1.45
(h) 30-90  0.09 0.59  -0.23 0.22 2.21 †8.79
(57)  †4.77 † 4.19  -1.98
(i) 51-90  0.01 1.55  0.35 0.45 -0.34 -0.15 0.47 1.75 †7.66
(38)  0.40  †3.50  1.08 1.16 -0.80 -1.55
(j) 49-90   1.61  -0.10 0.45 2.04 -
(40)   † 4.10  -0.25
(k) 49-90   1.51  0.47 2.05 -
(40)   † 16.9 
 
(B) dependent variable: gNDVO 
lagged variables of  R
2 DW F   Period  C 
DD RNMP CS      
(l) 30-90  0.66 -0.08 0.11 -0.05 0.16 1.98 †4.66
(57)  1.23 -1.22 1.42 -0.51
(m) 49-90  2.68 -0.32 -0.23 0.54 0.00 1.48 0.52
(40)  1.17 -1.02 -1.44 1.22
  current variables of  R
2 DW F 
 
   
DD RNMP CS       
(n) 29-90  -0.39 0.04 0.18 -0.23 0.24 2.07 †6.88
(58)  -0.73 0.73 *2.62*-2.44
(o) 49-90  2.94 -0.34 -0.32 0.64 0.05 1.77 1.65
(40)  1.26 -1.11 -2.05 1.50
 
Notation: See text and the Appendix Table for the names of variables; C: constant; Dmy: a dummy 
variable which is 1 in the years of 1923 to 1946 and zero in the other years; R
2: adjusted R 
squared, DW: Durbin-Watson statistic; F: F-value; †: significant at the 1% level; *: significant 
at the 5% level. 
Notes: The upper entries of the column 'Period' indicate the start and end years of the sample; the lower 
figures in parentheses show the number of sample. The upper figures of the variable entries are 





Table 6 Impulse response analysis of the VAR models 
 
  Shock from: 
  gDD gRNMP  gNDVO 
Response 
Lag1NT 
gDD  0.13 -0.05  0.03 
gRNMP  0.09 0.09 0.00 
gNDVO  0.07 -0.02  0.11 
Lag2WT 
gDD  0.07 -0.06  0.03 
gRNMP  0.06 0.09 0.00 
gNDVO  0.02 -0.05  0.08 
Lag1,5NT 
gDD  0.10 -0.06  0.03 
gRNMP  0.08 0.09 0.00 
gNDVO  0.04 -0.04  0.10 
Lag3NT 
gDD  0.12 -0.05  0.02 
gRNMP  0.09 0.07  -0.01 
gNDVO  0.08 -0.05  0.08 
 
Notes: 
1. One standard deviation shock at the variables of origin (in the row second from above). The figures are 
the cumulative changes in the variables of destination (in the column first from left) at the end of the 
3rd period after the shock. 
2. The Cholesky ordering: gRNMP, gDD, gNDVO. 







Table 7 Impulse response analysis of the VEC models 
 
 shock  from: 
 DD  RNMP NDVO 
Response     Lag1ND 
DD  0.23 -0.10  0.02 
RNMP  0.14 0.22  -0.02 
NDVO  0.06 -0.12  0.30 
Lag1WD 
DD  0.23 -0.09  0.02 
RNMP  0.15 0.16  -0.02 
NDVO  0.07 -0.11  0.31 
Lag2ND 
DD  0.17 -0.05  0.05 
RNMP  0.13 0.22  -0.03 
NDVO  0.05 -0.12  0.28 
Lag3ND 
DD  0.15 -0.04  0.07 
RNMP  0.13 0.22  -0.04 
NDVO  0.01 -0.14  0.26 
 
Notes: 
1. One standard deviation shock at the variable of origin (in the row second from above) . The figures are 
the cumulative changes in the variables of destination at the end of the 3rd period after the shock. 
2. The Cholesky ordering: gRNMP, gDD, gNDVO. 
3.  Lag x*D indicates the model specification: n: the order of lag; ND: without the dummy variable 






Table 8 Error correction terms in the VEC models 
 
(A) Adjustment coefficient of the error correction term 
   Adjustment  coefficient in the 
estimated equation of: 
Models  gNDVO  gDD  gRNMP

























(B) Elasticity in the estimated long term relation 
    Estimated coefficient of: 
Models   DD  RNMP D2346
Lag1ND   -2.66  2.96  -
Lag1WD   -2.07  1.34  -0.89
Lag2ND   1.45  0.08  -
Lag3ND   3.16  -1.33  -
 
Notes: 
1. In Panel (A), the upper values are the estimated coefficients and the lower values the t statistics. 
2. Panel (B) shows the coefficients, a1, a2, and a3, in the long term relation equation calculated from the 
estimated error collection term: NDVO=a1·DD+a2·RNMP+a3·D2346+a4·Constant.  





Table 9 Variance decomposition of the VEC models (%) 
 
source of the variation: 
 NDVO  DD  RNMP 
Lag1ND 
NDVO  12.0 82.4 5.6 
RNMP  1.1 0.9 98.0 
Lag1WD 
NDVO  80.5 13.9 5.6 
RNMP  1.6 5.1 93.4 
Lag2ND 
NDVO  79.4 12.9 7.59 
RNMP  2.0 0.7 97.3 
Lag3ND 
NDVO  77.1 8.1 14.8 
RNMP  4.3 0.3 95.4 
Notes: 
1. The variances of NDVO and RNMP at the 3rd period are decomposed by the sources of the variation: 
NDVO, DD, and RNMP. The sum of each row makes 100%.   
2. Cholesky ordering: RNMP, DD, NDVO. 






























































































































25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
A X _NDVO_R_NMP NDVO/RNMP 
DD/NNMP  DD/NNMP  DD/NNMP  DD/RNMP 
M1/NNMP  M1/DD 
NDVO/DD  NDVO/M1 
NDVO/NNMP Chart 2 Monetary indicators 
 






























































































































































Notation: See Table 6 for the notation of the model settings; ***: significant at the 1% level; **: 























































Notation: See Table 7 for the notation of the model settings; ***: significant at the 1% level; **: 
























Lag1ND  Lag1WD  Lag2WD  Lag3ND 
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 Appendix Table 
 
 NNMP  RNMP PLEV NDVO DDC S DPO CRD 
1923  12.5 61  205.0  0.33  6  - - - 
1924  15.8 67  236.0  0.93  7  - - - 
1925  22.0 80  274.8  1.32 10  - - - 
1926  23.8  103  230.8 1.49  12 - 0.07 - 
1927  25.3  110  230.3 1.75  14 - 0.13 - 
1928  28.8  119  242.2 2.10  16 - 0.21 - 
1929  33.3  138  241.2  2.86  24 16.2 0.32  - 
1930  43.7  167  261.6  4.36  30 19.4 0.49  - 
1931  57.2  195  293.6  5.67  46 30.3 0.73  - 
1932  80.4  217  370.6  8.41  67 44.3 0.97  - 
1933  97.0  231  419.9  6.86  71 50.5 1.18  - 
1934  128.7  266  483.8  7.73  83 60.8 1.64  - 
1935  185.5 317  585.2  9.71 101  78.9  2.46  - 
1936  213.8 410  521.6  11.26 126  104.2  3.54  - 
1937  243.8 459  531.2  13.58 150  121.9  4.52  - 
1938  257.4 500  514.8  17.22 172  136.6  6.06  - 
1939  328.8 558  589.2  22.21 208  164.2  7.06  - 
1940  368.2 535  688.2  22.10 228  184.3  7.25  - 
1941  404.1 492  821.3  34.73 217  161.3  4.96  - 
1942  330.1 352  939.1  45.83 240  95.8  4.41  - 
1943  418.6 397  1054.5  57.37 424  110.2  4.41  - 
1944  489.6 473  1034.5  64.53 540  148.0  5.23  - 
1945  441.4 445  992.1  73.89 484  183.8  9.00  - 
1946  -  419  -  65.83  503 267.6 12.21  - 
1947  -  500  -  13.42  569 341.4 12.66  - 
1948  -  620  -  23.78  433 318.1 12.88  - 
1949  -  730  -  27.13  455 344.5 15.46  14.3 
1950  740.4  877 844.2  33.11  495 373.9 18.53  19.3 
1951  780.9  985 792.8  33.99  533 399.0 21.92  21.8 
1952  812.6  1092 744.1  36.44  567 419.2 26.45  23.7 
1953  856.9  1196 716.5  38.25  587 459.0 38.65  24.3 
1954  918.3  1341 684.8  45.74  638 506.0 48.35  22.4 
1955  985.0  1501 656.2  46.97  668 529.3 53.66  25.4 
1956  1068.0  1671 639.1  54.47  717 569.1 63.75  28.8 
1957  1128.0  1788 630.9  56.44  785 648.1 81.00  32.7 
1958  1277.0  2010 635.3  61.79  826 709.1 87.19  37.1 
1959  1362.0  2160 630.6  67.05  877 759.4  100.56  43.8 
1960  1450.0  2327 623.1  58.77  925 829.0  109.09  46.5 
1961  1529.0  2485 615.3  77.04  994 856.0  116.71  51.5 
1962  1646.0 2628  626.3  92.66 1065  929.0  127.45 55.4 
1963  1688.0 2732  617.9  101.04 1119  982.0  180.00 61.0 
1964  1813.0 2986  607.2  113.52 1184  1034.0  157.07 69.2 
1965  1935.0 3192  606.2  131.03 1301  1120.0  187.27 74.0 
1966  2074.0 3450  601.2  154.31 1420  1209.0  229.15 85.4 
1967  2255.0 3748  601.7  178.78 1542  1324.0  268.69 94.2 
1968  2441.0 4059  601.4  206.36 1693  1438.0  323.60  109.5 
1969  2619.0 4253  615.7  230.03 1818  1546.0  383.97  116.1 
1970  2899.0 4636  625.3  230.71 1955  1662.0  466.00  126.2 
1971  3050.0 4896  623.0  253.45 2089  1773.0  532.15  137.0 
1972  3136.0 5087  616.5  280.55 2231  1885.0  607.32  150.5 
1973  3378.0 5540  609.8  305.94 2353  1986.0  686.60  168.9 
1974  3540.0 5839  606.3  340.80 2527  2103.0  789.05  188.7 
1975  3633.0 6101  595.4  380.92 2716  2245.0  909.85  204.0 
1976  3857.0 6461  596.9  421.11 2848  2351.0  1030.00  227.9 
1977  4056.0 6752  600.7  456.30 2987  2465.0  1166.60  254.0 
1978  4263.0 7097  600.7  484.56 3142  2588.0  1311.39  274.9 
1979  4383.0 7253  604.3  497.81 3288  2724.0  1462.40  300.4 
1980  4622.0 7536  613.4  531.00 3462  2900.0  1565.00  342.6 
1981  4867.0 7784  625.2  541.24 3619  3067.0  1657.00  413.5 
1982  5234.0 8096  646.5  576.18 3771  3170.0  1743.42  445.5 
1983  5472.0 8436  648.7  629.25 3950  3283.0  1869.00  469.7 
1984  5696.0 8680  656.2  670.87 4095  3390.0  2020.58  496.8 
1985  5785.0 8819  656.0  711.91 4242  3474.0  2208.00  521.3 
1986  5874.0 9022  651.1  751.01 4393  3569.0  2428.00  452.6 
1987  5996.0 9166  654.1  809.95 4560  3678.0  2669.00  432.1 
1988  6308.0 9570  659.2  927.70 4981  3944.0  2967.00  404.6 
1989  6737.0 9809  686.8  1111.19 5625  4317.0  3378.00  391.1 
1990  7006.0 9415  744.1  1395.36 6545  4985.0  3814.00  364.4 
    -: not available. 
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 Notes and Sources: 
NNMP: nominal net material product; in billion before 1961 Ruble 
The figures for 1923-27 are taken from RGAE(F7733/O4/E1052/L51). The figures for 1928-31 and 1935 are based on the 
figures in Vainshtein(1969); for 1924-27, the original fiscal year figures are adjusted to the calendar year annual figure under the 
assumption that a quarterly growth rate is equal to the annual rate powered with the factor of 1/4. For 1928-31, the amounts of 
turnover tax were added to the original Vainshtein figures according to Suhara (2008). The 1933 figure is estimated by Suhara 
(2008). Vainshtein (1969) reported another figure slightly different from Simonov(1996, p. 181)’s for 1937 and 
RGAE(F1562/O3/D698/L81) did for 1938. Because Simonov uses the archive materials newer than that Vainshtein used and 
RGAE(F1562/O3/D698/L81), I took Simonov’s figures for 1937 and 1938. The 1932, 1934, and 1936 figures are my own 
estimation; For the estimation, I used the estimation equation which regresses NNMP to household money income, nominal retail 
trade turnover, year-end stock of currency in circulation, state budget revenue, and RNMP. The data for 1946-49 are not available. 
The data after 1950 are taken from Narkhoz. 
The before 1961 Ruble means that the figures after 1961 denomination were simply multiplied by the factor of 10; the Soviet 
official statistics uses the same method as well. 
 
RNMP: index number, 1913=100. 
An official series of RNMP from 1925 through to 1991 is not published. Three published series the base years of which were 
1926, 1960, and 1980 were connected with the annual growth rates; I used the series those have a newer base year as much as 
possible. The 1923 and 1924 figures were estimated using the estimation equation which regresses RNMP for 1913, 1917, 1920, 
1921, and 1925 to agriculture and industrial production at the price before the WW1 in Segal and Santalov (1930, pp. 92-93). 
 
PLEV: the implicit deflator of net material product, index number. 
PLEV is calculated from NNMP and RNMP. The Soviet official statistics used the ‘constant price’ to deflate NNMP to RNMP; 
PLEV and the standard GDP deflator are, therefore, methodologically different.   
 
DD: annual money income of the household sector in billion of before 1961 Ruble. 
CBR(2006) published the series of DD from 1923/24 through to 1990. The same method as to adjust an original fiscal-year 
figure of NNMP to a calendar year figure was applied for DD for 1923-28. DD includes wages, kolkhoz payments, pensions and 
other social payments, and payments from financial institutions; it excludes only the money income from trade of goods within the 
household sector. 
 
NDVO: the end year stock of currency; in billion before 1961 Ruble. 
CBR(2007a) published the NDVO series; NDVO is equivalent to the currency item in the debt side of the Gosbank balance 
sheet. NDVO, therefore, includes the currency that the Gosbank and other banks hold. RGAE(F1562/O33/E3012/L25) showed the 
same series for 1922 through to 1955 which differ only slightly from the CBR(2007a) series.   
CBR (2007a) shows the year-end amounts of various government paper moneys denominated at 1923 ruble, of Chervonetz 
denominated at 1924 ruble, and of other credit moneys such as Gold Ruble issued in 1924 separately and did not show the total sum 
for 1923. I recalculated the amount of the government paper moneys at 1924 ruble with using the ratio of one 1924 ruble to 50 
thousands 1923 Ruble according to Segal and Santalov (1925) and added it to the amount of Chervonets and the other credit moneys. 
It turned out that the amount of government paper moneys denominated at 1924 ruble accounted for only about one percent of the 
total end-year currency stock denominated at 1924 ruble.   
 
DPO: the end year stock of the household savings at the Sberkassa in billion before 1961 Ruble. 
The DPO series are taken from Narkhoz; the figure for 1957 is, however, taken from RGAE(F1562/O41/E233/L134). 
RGAE(F1562/O41/E233/L134) shows the DPO figures for 1940, 1950, and 1955-57; the figures before 1957 are the same as those 
Narkhoz shows. 
DPO is not equal to all bank deposits hold by the household sector. There existed  households saving deposits at financial 
institutions other than Sberkassa until 1929. On the other hand, Narkhoz indicated that DPO included savings of legal entities for 
1928-33; it is not certain if DPO includes deposits of legal entities for other years. IMF (1991, vol.1, p.130) showed the DPO figure 
for 1980 that is the same as the figure Narkhoz and comments that the figure is the total amount of the household saving deposits 
held by both Sberkassa and the other financial institutions. Narkhoz shows, however, the amount of saving deposits at Sberkassa 
and at Gosbank separately for 1979. The amount of the household saving deposits at Gosbank for 1979 is almost the same as that for 
1948. The year of 1948 is the earliest year for which I can find the amount of household saving deposit at Gosbank. The Gosbank 
household deposits accounted for 17.3% of the Sberkassa household deposits in 1948, while it accounted for 0.13% of that in 1979.  
 
CS: retail sales turnover in billion of before 1961 ruble.   
The CS series were taken from CBR (2006). CS includes retail turnover of state and cooperative shops, public catering, and 
spending on services.   
 
CRD: the end year stock of the total bank credits in billion of before 1961 ruble. 
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